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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
78A-4-103(2)(j) (2009). Direct appeal of the trial court's denial of Defendant's Motion 
to Compel Arbitration is taken pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78B-1 l-129(l)(a) (2008). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
I. Whether the trial court erred in denying Defendant/Appellant Charles 
Bova5 M.D.'s ("Dr. Bova") Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Litigation ("Dr. 
Bova's Motion to Compel") by relying on extrinsic evidence in the form of declarations 
submitted by Plaintiff/Appellee Glenna Stewart ("Plaintiff) to conclude that the 
unambiguous language of the two Arbitration Agreements (the "Agreements") signed by 
Plaintiff does not confirm that Plaintiff was verbally encourage to ask questions regarding 
the Agreements pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-421(l)(c)(ii). 
Preservation of Issue: This issue was preserved in the trial court in Plaintiffs 
Memorandum in Opposition to Dr. Bova's Motion to Compel Arbitration [R. 28-48], Dr. 
Bova's Reply Memorandum in Support of his Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay 
Litigation [R. 52-64], Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Dr. Bova's Motion to 
Compel Arbitration and Stay Litigation [R. 110-115], Plaintiffs Supplemental 
Memorandum in Opposition to Dr. Bova's Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay 
Litigation [R. 148-152], at the June 15, 2009 Hearing on Dr. Bova's Motion to Compel 
(the "First Hearing") [R. 336], at the October 19, 2009 Hearing on Dr. Bova's Motion to 
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Compel (the "Second Hearing") [R. 337], and at the December 105 2009 Hearing on Dr. 
Bova's Motion to Compel and Dr. Bova's Motion to Stay Litigation Pending Appeal (the 
"ThirdHearing'')[R.338]. 
Standard of Review: A trial court's interpretation of a written contract is reviewed 
for correctness, granting no deference to the trial court. Cafe Rio, Inc. v Larkin-Gifford-
Overton, LLC, 2009 UT 27, \ 21, 207 P.3d 1235. 
II. Whether the trial court erred by failing to conclude that the unambiguous 
language of the arbitration agreements met all statutory and common law requirements for 
a valid and enforceable contract, and for an arbitration agreement under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78B-3-421(l)(c)(ii) (2008). 
Preservation of Issue: This issue was preserved in the trial court in Plaintiffs 
Memorandum in Opposition to Dr. Bova's Motion to Compel Arbitration [R. 28-48]. Dr. 
Bova's Reply Memorandum in Support of his Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay 
Litigation [R. 52-64], Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Dr. Bova's Motion to 
Compel Arbitration and Stay Litigation [R. 110-115], Plaintiffs Supplemental 
Memorandum in Opposition to Dr. Bova's Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay 
Litigation [R. 148-152], at the June 15, 2009 Hearing on Dr. Bova's Motion to Compel 
(the "First Hearing") [R. 336], at the October 19, 2009 Hearing on Dr. Bova's Motion to 
Compel (the "Second Hearing") [R. 337], and at the December 10, 2009 Hearing on Dr. 
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Bova's Motion to Compel and Dr. Bova's Motion to Stay Litigation Pending Appeal (the 
"ThkdHearing")[R.338]. 
Standard of Review: A trial court's interpretation of a written contract is reviewed 
for correctness, granting no deference to the trial court. Cafe Rio, Inc. v Larkin-Gifford-
Overton, LLC, 2009 UT 275 lj 21,207 P.3d 1235. 
PROVISIONS OF STATUTES AND RULES 
The interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-421 is of importance to this appeal, 
a copy of which is attached hereto as Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings Below 
This is a medical malpractice case arising out of lumbar nerve root injection 
procedure (the "Procedure") performed by Dr. Bova on the Plaintiff on April 16, 2008. 
Prior to the Procedure, Plaintiff signed an arbitration agreement (the "April 16th 
Agreement') agreeing to arbitrate all claims related to the care and treatment provided by 
Dr. Bova. The day after the Procedure, on April 17,2008, Plaintiff was seen by Dr. Bova 
for a follow-up appointment and signed a second arbitration agreement (the "April 17th 
Agreement"). The April 16th and 17th Agreements are identical. In response to Plaintiffs 
Complaint and prior to any other responsive pleadings being filed, Dr. Bova filed his 
Motion to Compel, joined by Pioneer Valley Hospital, which Plaintiff opposed. 
Arguments on Dr. Bova's Motion were heard on three different dates: (1) June 15, 2009; 
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(2) October 19, 2009; and (3) December 10, 2009. Judge Kennedy entered an order on 
December 10, 2009 denying Dr. Bova's Motion on the basis that Plaintiffs declarations 
demonstrated that she was not verbally encouraged to ask questions regarding the 
Agreements in contravention of Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3 -421(1 )(c)(ii) (2008). This 
appeal followed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Dr. Bova is a pain management physician licensed to practice medicine in the State 
of Utah. [R. 1]. On April 16, 2008, Dr. Bova performed the Procedure on the Plaintiff. 
[R. 2]. Prior to the Procedure, the Plaintiff signed the April 16th Agreement.1 [R. 14]. 
Plaintiff was accompanied by her daughter, a registered nurse who is familiar with health 
care providers having their patients sign arbitration agreements. [R. 45]. Under the terms 
of the April 16th Agreement, the Plaintiff agreed to resolve any claim for medical 
malpractice arising out of the care rendered by Dr. Bova by mediation or arbitration. 
[Addendum B at Art. 3]. The April 16th Agreement gives the Plaintiff the unilateral right 
to rescind the Agreement within 10 days of signing. [Id. at Art. 7.BJ. The Agreement 
includes Plaintiffs acknowledgment that: 
I have received a written explanation of the terms of this 
Agreement. I have had the right to ask questions and have my 
questions answered. I understand that any Claims I might 
have must be resolved through the dispute resolution process 
1
 A true and correct copy of the April 16th Agreement is attached hereto as 
Addendum B. 
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in this Agreement instead of having them heard by a judge or 
jury. I understand the role of the arbitrators and the manner in 
which they are selected. I understand the responsibility for 
arbitration related costs. I understand that this Agreement 
renews each year unless cancelled before the renewal date. I 
understand that I can decline to enter into the Agreement and 
still receive health care. I understand that I can rescind this 
Agreement within 10 days of signing it. 
[Id. at Art. 9]. The Agreement also contains Plaintiffs acknowledgment that "I have 
received a copy of this document." [Id. at Art. 10]. The day after the procedure, on April 
17, 2008, Plaintiff was seen by Dr. Bova for a follow-up appointment and signed the 
April 17th Agreement.2 [R. 59]. The April 16th and 17th Agreements are identical. 
[Compare Addendum B with Addendum C]. 
By way of Complaint dated January 7,2009, Plaintiff sued Dr. Bova and Pioneer 
Valley Hospital claiming medical malpractice for injury allegedly arising out of the April 
16, 2008 Procedure. [R. 1-6]. Dr. Bova filed his Motion to Compel on February 18, 
2009 requesting that the trial court compel arbitration, joined by Pioneer Valley Hospital, 
pursuant to the terms of the April 16th Agreement. [R. 10-12]. On March 13, 2009, 
Plaintiff filed her Memorandum in Opposition to Dr. Bova's Motion. [R. 28-48]. 
Attached to Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition were two declarations—one by the 
Plaintiff, and the other by her daughter—asserting that the Plaintiff was not verbally 
encouraged to ask questions regarding the Agreement, and that she did not receive a copy 
2
 A true and correct copy of the April 17th Agreement is attached hereto as 
Addendum C. 
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of the Agreement. [R. 40-48]. Based on these declarations, Plaintiff argued that the April 
16th Agreement was procedurally unconscionable because she was not verbally 
encouraged to ask questions as required by Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-421(1 )(c)(ii). [R. 28-
37]. 
Dr. Bova and Pioneer Valley Hospital responded by arguing that Plaintiffs 
declarations were impermissible parol evidence and should not be considered by the 
Court because the terms of the April 16th Agreement were unambiguous. [R. 52-60]. Dr. 
Bova also argued that the execution of the April 16th Agreement was not procedurally 
unconscionable under common law, and that Plaintiffs unambiguous acknowledgment 
that she "had the right to ask questions and have my questions answered*' demonstrates 
that the execution of the Agreement was in compliance with Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-
422(1 )(c)(ii). [Id.] Dr. Bova farther argued that Plaintiff executed an identical agreement 
the day after she executed the April 16th Agreement (i.e., the April 17th Agreement) which 
further demonstrates Plaintiffs understanding of the terms of the April 16th Agreement, 
and that the April 16th Agreement was validly executed under Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-
421 and common law principles of procedural unconscionability. [Id.] 
Arguments on Dr. Bova's Motion to Compel were heard by the Honorable John 
Paul Kennedy on three different occasions: during the first hearing on June 15, 2009 [R. 
336]: during the second hearing on October 19. 2009 [R. 337]; and during the third 
hearing on December 10, 2009. [R. 338]. The purpose of the second, October 19, 2009 
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hearing was to hear arguments regarding the dates the Agreements were signed by 
Plaintiff. [R. 336, p. 33; R. 337, p. 1]. Prior to the second hearing, the parties submitted 
Supplemental Memoranda regarding when the Agreements were signed by Plaintiff. [R. 
110-131; 148-152]. Dr. Bova submitted two declarations with his Supplemental 
Memorandum for the limited purpose of establishing the dates the Agreements were 
signed by Plaintiff. [R. 110-131; 337, pp. 22-23; R. 338, p. 6]. Judge Kennedy ultimately 
declined to issue a ruling on when the Agreements were signed by Plaintiff. [R. 349-
353]. The purpose of the third, December 10, 2009 hearing was to: (1) correct the date 
Judge Kennedy entered his Memorandum and Order denying Dr. Bova's Motion to 
Compel [R. 338, pp. 1-12]; and (2) hear arguments on Defendant's Joint Motion to Stay 
Litigation Pending Appeal [R. 338, pp. 12-14]. Judge Kennedy corrected the date he 
entered his Memorandum and Order denying Dr. Bova's Motion to Compel to reflect its 
entry on December 10, 2009. [R. 349-353; 358-359]. Judge Kennedy also summarily 
denied Defendants' Joint Motion to Stay Litigation pending appeal. [R. 338, pp. 12-14; R. 
358-359]. 
Ultimately, by Memorandum and Order dated December 10, 2009, Judge Kennedy 
denied Dr. Bova's Motion to Compel on the bases that: (1) Plaintiffs declarations 
demonstrated that she was not verbally encouraged to ask questions regarding the 
Agreement as required by Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-421(l)(c)(ii); and (2) Plaintiffs 
acknowledgment in the Agreements that she "had the right to ask questions and have my 
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questions answered" does not satisfy the requirement that she be verbally encouraged to 
ask questions pursuant to § 78B-3-421(1 )(c)(ii). [R. 349-352]. Judge Kennedy did not 
find that Plaintiff did not receive a copy of the Agreements. [Id.] Judge Kennedy further 
clarified his ruling in his Memorandum and Order for Hearing on Defendants' Joint 
Motion to Stay Litigation Pending Appeal by stating: ;*[t]he arbitration agreements at 
issue were not validly executed as a matter of law because the Court finds that the 
plaintiff was not verbally encouraged as required by Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-421(l)(c)." 
[R. 358-359]. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. The April 16th Agreement is valid and enforceable under both Utah Code 
Ann. § 78B-3-421, and Utah contract law. First, the Agreement complies with the 
requirements set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-421 (2008) to create a valid and 
enforceable physician/patient arbitration agreement. Although Plaintiff contends that 
only one of several requirements set forth in § 78B-3-421 wras not met. she cannot dispute 
that the underlying purpose of the statute was satisfied, namely, that she understood the 
terms of the April 16th Agreement when she signed it. Second, under well-established 
Utah contract law, Plaintiff cannot claim ignorance of the Agreement's terms after she 
signed it to escape its enforcement. Third, the trial court erred in relying on parol 
evidence in the form of Plaintiff s declarations to conclude that a single statutory 
requirement in § 78B-3-421 was not met. Finally, the execution of the Agreement was 
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not procedurally unconscionable because Plaintiff: (1) received a copy of the Agreement; 
(2) had the unrestricted opportunity to rescind it within ten days of signing it; (3) executed 
an identical Agreement a day later; and (4) was accompanied by her daughter—a nurse 
with knowledge of and experience with patients signing arbitration agreements—when 
she executed the April 16th Agreement. 
II. The trial court's interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-421 is incorrect 
and undermines the purpose of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act. One of the primary 
purposes of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act is to "expedite early evaluation and 
settlement of claims." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-402 (2008). Arbitration furthers this goal 
by providing an expeditious inexpensive method to resolve disputes. If, however, health 
care providers are required to prove by extrinsic evidence that a patient has been verbally 
encouraged to read and sign an arbitration agreement, the inevitable result will be far 
fewer arbitrations. This result undermines both the purpose of the statute and long-
standing Utah policy in favor of arbitration. Given that Plaintiff has acknowledged that 
she was given the opportunity to ask questions regarding the agreement and understood 
its terms and conditions, legislative intent and public policy would best be served by 
enforcing the Arbitration Agreement. 
9 
ARGUMENT 
L THE APRIL 16TH AGREEMENT IS VALID AND ENFORCEABLE UNDER 
BOTH UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-3-421, AND UTAH CONTRACT LAW. 
Under Utah law, ;;[a] party claiming unconscionability bears a heavy burden." 
Ryan v. Dan's Food Stores, Inc., 972 P.2d 395, 402 (Utah 1998); accord Resource 
Management Co. v. Weston Ranch, 706 P.2d 1028, 1041 (Utah 1985). In opposing Dr. 
Bova's Motion to Compel, Plaintiff argued that the execution of the April 16th Agreement 
was procedurally unconscionable because she was not verbally encouraged to ask 
questions regarding the Agreement prior to signing it in contravention of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78B-3-421 (2008). [R. 28-48J.3 In support of her arguments, Plaintiff submitted two 
declarations in which Plaintiff and her daughter assert that Plaintiff was not verbally 
encouraged to ask questions regarding the Agreement. [Id.] Plaintiff does not dispute, 
however, her unambiguous acknowledgments that she understood the Agreement's terms. 
[Id.] Despite Plaintiffs unambiguous acknowledgments that she knew what she was 
signing, the trial court relied on Plaintiffs declarations to find that the April 16th 
Agreement was not enforceable because a single requirement of § 78B-3-421 had not 
been met. [R. 349-352]. The trial court erred in reaching this conclusion because it 
3
 Significantly, Plaintiff does not claim that the April 16th Agreement is 
substantively unconscionable. [R. 28-48]. While substantive unconscionability may alone 
support a finding of unconscionability, ''procedural unconscionability without any 
substantive imbalance will rarely render a contract unconscionable.55 Ryan, 927 P.2d at 
402. Thus, Plaintiffs already heavy burden to demonstrate unconscionability7 is greatly 
increased. 
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ignored the plain and unambiguous language of the Agreement and well-established Utah 
contract law directly on point. Accordingly, this Court should reverse the trial court and 
compel Plaintiff to arbitrate her claims pursuant to the terms of the April 16th Agreement. 
A. The Agreement Complies with Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-421. 
The Utah Supreme Court has long recognized "the strong public policy in favor of 
arbitration as an approved, practical and inexpensive means of settling disputes and 
easing court congestion." Robinson & Wells v. Warren, 669 P.2d 844, 846 (Utah 1983); 
accord Chandler v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 833 P.2d 356, 368 (Utah 1992). Indeed, 
according to the Utah Supreme Court, "if there is any question as to whether the parties 
agreed to resolve their disputes through arbitration or litigation... we interpret the 
agreement keeping in mind our policy of encouraging arbitration." Central Florida 
Investments, Inc. v. Parkwest Associates, 2002 UT 3, \ 16, 40 P.3d 599. 
One of the stated purposes of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act is to "provide 
other procedural changes to expedite early evaluation and settlement of claims." Utah 
Code Ann. § 78B-3-402(3) (2008). Consistent with this purpose, in 1999 the Utah 
legislature amended the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act and codified the enforceability 
of physician-patient arbitration agreements as favored public policy. The statute specifies 
agreement terms and includes the information that must be provided to the patient 
regarding arbitration, how that information is to be provided to the patient, and an 
acknowledgment by the patient that she received the information. See Utah Code Ann. § 
11 
78B-3-421(l) (2008). The level of detail embodied in the statute reveals the legislature's 
intent to ensure the validity and enforcement of arbitration agreements entered into 
between physicians and their patients that meet the requirements of the statute. Indeed, 
the purpose of the statute is to avoid the very claims of procedural unconscionability 
asserted by Plaintiff. 
Comparison of the Agreement with the requirements of Utah Code Ann. §§ 78B-3-
421(l)(a) and (b) demonstrates that the Agreement complies with the legislatively-
established requirements to create a presumptively valid and enforceable physician-
patient arbitration agreement. (Compare Addendum A, with Addendum B). The only 
deviations from the statutory requirements alleged by Plaintiff are that: (1) she was not 
verbally encouraged to read the Agreement and ask questions about it and (2) she did not 
receive a copy of the Agreement.4 [R. 28-48]. Plaintiffs allegations are specious at best. 
As an initial matter, Plaintiffs allegations are directly contradicted by her own 
unambiguous acknowledgments that she received a copy of the Agreement, understood its 
terms and was given the opportunity to ask questions. [Addendum B at Art. 9]. These 
acknowledgments plainly demonstrate that the underlying purpose of the statutory 
requirements were met, namely, that she be given an opportunity to understand what she 
4
 Regarding the second allegation, the trial court did not address whether Plaintiff 
received a copy of the April 16tn Agreement. Instead, the trial court's decision was based 
solely on the issue of whether she wras verbally encouraged to read and ask questions 
regarding the Agreement. 
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was signing to avoid any issues of procedural unconscionability. Indeed, Plaintiff does 
not contradict any of her other, more significant acknowledgments that she understood 
her claims would be arbitrated, and understood the role of the arbitrators and how they 
would be selected. [R. 28-48]. It is simply nonsensical to hold an agreement 
unenforceable on the basis that only one of many statutory requirements designed to 
prevent misunderstanding of the terms of an Agreement was not met, when the Plaintiff 
clearly acknowledges that she understood the terms of the Agreement. 
The trial court, however, concluded that the lack of evidence that the Plaintiff be 
verbally encouraged to ask questions regarding the Agreement rendered the entire 
Agreement unenforceable. [R.349-352]. The trial court's conclusion not only ignores the 
underlying purpose of the statute and the policy favoring arbitration, it disregards well-
established contract law.5 
B. Utah Contract Law Prohibits Plaintiffs After-the-Fact Attempt to 
Undo Her Agreement 
In 1996 the Utah Supreme Court made clear that arbitration agreements are valid 
and enforceable in the physician-patient context, stating: 
We emphasize preliminarily that arbitration agreements are 
favored in Utah and that no public policy requires such 
agreements to be subject to a different analysis when they are 
between physicians and patients. They are enforceable if they 
meet the standards applicable to all contracts. 
5
 The purpose of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act and Utah policy favoring 
arbitration are discussed in more detail in Section II. 
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Sosa v. Paulos, 924 P.2d 357, 359 (Utah 1996). Under well-established Utah contract 
law, a party to a contract is bound to all contract provisions and. absent fraud or mistake, 
cannot assert lack of understanding to avoid the contract. Semenov v. Hill, 1999 UT 58, f^ 
12, 982 P.2d 578. Specifically, "a signatory cannot, with hindsight, claim ignorance of 
the contract and thereby escape liability." Western Properties v. Southern Utah Aviation, 
Inc., 776 P.2d 656, 658 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). "Each party has the burden to understand 
the terms of a contract before he affixes his signature to it and may not thereafter assert 
his ignorance as a defense/' Resource Management Co. v. Weston Ranch & Livestock 
Co., 706 P.2d 1028, 1047 (Utah 1985). "In Utah, contracts mean what they say, and 
parties will be bound by them." Russ v. Woodside Homes, Inc., 905 P.2d 901, 906 n.l 
(Utah 1995); John Call Engineering, Inc. v. Manti City Corp., 743 P.2d 1205, 1207-1208 
(Utah 1987). In other words, "a person who signs a contract must be presumed to have 
read, understood and assented to i t . . . . " C.J.S. Contracts § 705 (2010). "The fact that a 
contracting party fails to read papers or does not have someone else read them to him or 
her does not rebut the presumption." Id. 
Overlaid on these axioms of Utah contract law are Plaintiffs unambiguous 
acknowledgments that: 
I have received a written explanation of the terms of this 
Agreement. I have had the right to ask questions and have my 
questions answered. I understand that any Claims I might 
have must be resolved through the dispute resolution process 
in this Agreement instead of having them heard by a judge or 
jury. I understand the role of the arbitrators and the manner in 
14 
which they are selected. I understand the responsibility for 
arbitration related costs. I understand that this Agreement 
renews each year unless cancelled before the renewal date. I 
understand that I can decline to enter into the Agreement and 
still receive health care. I understand that I can rescind this 
Agreement within 10 days of signing it. 
[Addendum B at Art. 9]. Plaintiff does not dispute that she signed the April 16th 
Agreement, she does not contend the terms are ambiguous, and she does not allege fraud 
or mistake relating to this Agreement. [R. 28-48]. Thus, under well-established Utah law 
and the plain language of the Agreement, Plaintiff is deemed to have understood the 
terms of the Agreement and any claim of procedural unconscionability is without merit. 
Plaintiffs claims of ignorance are not a valid defense; she is bound by the terms of the 
Agreement that she signed on two occasions and is estopped from claiming otherwise. 
C. Plaintiffs Declarations Are Inadmissible Parol Evidence and Should 
Not Be Applied to Contradict Plaintiffs Unambiguous 
Acknowledgments. 
The purpose of the parol evidence rule is "to limit the ability of the fmder of fact 
(the jury) to believe testimony contradicting integrated writings." Ward v. Intermoiintain 
Farmers Ass., 907 P.2d 264, 269 (Utah 1995) (quoting 3 Arthur L. Corbin, Corbin on 
Contracts § 572C (Supp. 1994)). Consistent with this axiom of contract law, this Court 
has long held that "parol evidence is . . . not admissible to vary or contradict the clear and 
unambiguous terms of the contract." DCH Holdings, LLC v. Nielson, 2009 UT App 269, 
% 8, 220 P.3d 178 (citing Tangren Family Trust v. Tangren, 2008 UT 20, ^ f 11, 182 P.3d 
326). 
15 
A trial court may not consider parol evidence without first finding an ambiguity in 
the language of the contract. Flores v. Earnshaw, 2009 UT App 90, j^ 12, 209 P.3d 428. 
UA contractual term or provision is ambiguous if it is capable of more than one reasonable 
interpretation because of uncertain meanings of terms, missing terms or other facial 
deficiencies;' Park v. Stanford, 2009 UT App 307, % 10, 221 P.3d 877 (quoting Daines v. 
Vincent, 2008 UT 51, If 25, 1490 P.3d 1269). If the contract is unambiguous, the trial 
court may not consider parol evidence and must interpret the contract solely from the 
plain meaning of the contractual language. Cafe Rio, Inc. v. Larkin-Gijford-Overton, 
LLC, 2009 UT 27, ^ 25, 207 P.3d 1235. Indeed, ';[o]nly if the language of the contract is 
ambiguous will [the Court] consider extrinsic evidence/' Id. 
The sole basis of the trial court's determination that Plaintiff wras not verballv 
encouraged to ask questions regarding the Agreement is Plaintiffs self serving, after-the-
fact declaration that she was not verbally encouraged to ask questions. [R. 349-352]. 
Based on this parol evidence (and the lack of contradicting parol evidence submitted by 
Dr. Bova), the trial court found that "there is no proof that defendant 'verbally 
encouraged' the patient as required by statute" and ruled that the April 16th Agreement 
was unenforceable. [R. 351]. The trial court's reliance on Plaintiffs declaration to fmd 
the Agreement unenforceable is reversible error. 
As an initial matter, the trial court failed to find any ambiguity in the language of 
the April 16th Agreement. [R. 349-352]. That is because it could not do so. There is no 
16 
ambiguity in the terms of the Agreement, or in Plaintiffs acknowledgment that she 
understood those terms. Indeed, a cursory reading of the plain language of the Agreement 
illustrates that Plaintiff knew what she was signing. As a result, the trial court should not 
have even considered Plaintiffs declaration, let alone relied on it, in determining whether 
the April 16th Agreement satisfied the requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-421. 
Flores, 2009 UT App at f 12. The trial court should be reversed for this reason alone. 
In addition, it is undisputable that Plaintiff submitted her declarations to contradict 
her unambiguous acknowledgments that she understood the terms of the Agreement. [R. 
28-48]. Indeed, the underlying premise of her procedural unconscionability claim is that 
she did not understand what she was signing. Ostensibly recognizing that all of the other 
requirements of § 78B-3-421 were met, Plaintiff submitted her declarations in the hope 
that the trial court would focus on the single requirement that she be verbally encouraged 
to ask questions, and ignore her unambiguous acknowledgments that she understood what 
she was signing. And that is exactly what the trial court did. Although veiled in the 
failure to satisfy strict statutory mandate, the trial court's reliance on Plaintiffs parol 
evidence resulted in eviscerating the plain, unambiguous language of the Agreement 
demonstrating that Plaintiff understood the terms of the Agreement. Consistent with this 
Court's long standing precedent, the trial court's reliance on parol evidence should not be 
condoned. DCHHoldings, LLC, 2009 UT App at \ 8. 
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B. lhe Utah Supreme Court5 s Holding in Sosa Compels Enforcement of 
the April 16th Agreement 
In Sosa v. Pernios, the plaintiff argued that the execution of an arbitration 
agreement was procedurally unconscionable because she was presented with the 
agreement less than an hour prior to surgery when she was in an apprehensive and 
nervous condition. Sosa, 924 P.2d at 362. Like the instant case, the plaintiff in Sosa also 
argued that no one undertook to explain the document to her, and that she felt "rushed and 
hurried" by the manner of its presentation. Id. 
The majority of the Sosa court concluded that the execution of the agreement 
wrould not be procedurally unconscionable if: (1) the plaintiff was given a signed copy of 
the agreement following her surgery, and (2) she was not precluded from revoking the 
agreement within the fourteen day revocation period. Id at 365. The majority reasoned 
that if the plaintiff was aware of complications immediately following the surgery, 
"fourteen days was sufficient time for her to read and understand the agreement's 
unconditional revocation clause. During this fourteen day period, she would not have 
been forced to make a decision in a hurried, rushed, or anxious state, and her decision to 
revoke or not would have been a meaningful choice." Id. at 364. Indeed, the majority in 
Sosa made clear that the facts and circumstances surrounding the execution of the 
agreement did not demonstrate that ;;the whole transaction was tainted with procedural 
unconscionabilitv so as to render the entire agreement null and void." Id. at 365. 
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Like the majority of the Supreme Court in Sosa, this Court should find that 
Plaintiffs execution of the April 16th Agreement was not procedurally unconscionable. 
Plaintiff specifically acknowledged receiving a signed copy of the Agreement. 
[Addendum B at Art. 10]. Moreover, in specific compliance with Utah Code Ann. § 
78B-3-421, the Agreement gave Plaintiff the unfettered and unilateral right to revoke the 
Agreement within ten days of signing it. [Addendum B at Art. 9]. Thus, under Sosa, 
Plaintiffs acknowledgment that she received a copy of the Agreement and that it 
contained an easily understandable clause affording her the right to unilaterally revoke the 
Agreement within ten days precludes a determination that it is void because of alleged 
defects in procedure in forming the Agreement. Sosa, 924 P.2d at 365. 
In addition to the facts outlined in Sosa, there are other facts present in this case 
which demonstrate that the execution of the April 16th Agreement was not procedurally 
unconscionable. Plaintiffs execution of an identical agreement a day later (i.e., the April 
17th Agreement) provided her with yet another opportunity to understand the terms of the 
April 16th Agreement, and if she chose not to enter into it, she could have rescinded it. 
[Addendum C]. Further, Plaintiffs multiple acknowledgments in a two day period of 
understanding the Agreement's terms renders her allegations to the contrary hollow. A 
second fact weighing against a finding of procedural unconscionability is that Plaintiff 
was accompanied by her daughter when she executed the April 16th Agreement. [R. 29]. 
Her daughter is a nurse and is familiar with health care providers such as Dr. Bova having 
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their patients sign documents, including arbitration agreements, prior to rendering care. 
[Id.] Thus, not only was there another person present to aid Plaintiff in understanding 
what she was signing, this person had specific knowledge and experience with the very 
documents Plaintiff was signing. These facts, coupled with the fact that Plaintiff received 
a copy of the April 16th Agreement (and the April 17th Agreement) and had the ability to 
rescind it within ten days, negate Plaintiffs claim of procedural unconscionability. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF UCA §78B«3-421 IS 
INCORRECT AND UNDERMINES THE PURPOSE OF THE HEALTH 
CARE MALPRACTICE ACT. 
The trial court requires that Dr. Bova prove through extrinsic evidence that 
Plaintiff was verbally encouraged to read the Arbitration Agreement and ask questions. 
Yet, other than the suggestion that Dr. Bova could have filed an affidavit, the trial court 
did not explain how Dr. Bova could have, or should have, proved verbal encouragement. 
The reality is that it is nearly impossible for Dr. Bova, by extrinsic evidence, to prove that 
a verbal exchange took place in wilich Plaintiff was encouraged to read and sign the 
Arbitration Agreement. The problem is not unique to this case. The trial court sets up a 
scenario in w7hich health care providers are saddled with a burden of proof that is simply 
impossible to meet. If health care providers are required to prove by extrinsic evidence 
that a patient has been verbally encouraged to read and sign an arbitration agreement the 
inevitable result will be that far fewer arbitration agreements will be enforced. This result 
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undermines both the purpose of the statute and long-standing Utah policy in favor of 
arbitration. 
The provision requiring verbal encouragement must be reviewed within the 
context of the overall purpose of the statute. The Legislature clearly intended to 
encourage arbitration agreements in the health care context; at the same time, the 
Legislature wanted to ensure that patients have the opportunity to read and understand 
such agreements. Here, the Plaintiff has acknowledged on two occasions that she 
understood the terms of the Arbitration Agreement and was given the opportunity to ask 
questions. While there is no specific extrinsic evidence that Plaintiff was verbally 
encouraged, it is clear that the purpose of the statute has been fulfilled in this case. 
Requiring extrinsic evidence of verbal encouragement after a plaintiff has admitted that 
she understood the arbitration agreement and was given the opportunity to ask questions 
is simply nonsensical. 
A- The Trial Court's Interpretation of UCA § 78B-3-421 is Unreasonable 
and Would Result in Fewer Arbitrations 
The rules of statutory interpretation "require the court to give effect to the intent of 
the legislature in light of the purpose the statute was meant to achieve." State v. Miller, 
2008 UT 61, \ 18, 193 P.3d 92. Specific language of statutory provisions should not be 
interpreted in a manner that would "undermine the purpose of the statute." R&R Indus. 
Park LLC. v. Utah Property and Cas. Ins. Guar. Ass% 2008 UT 80, \ 36, 199 P.3d 
917. Additionally, statutes "must be interpreted in a reasonable way, with an eye toward 
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the construction that will achieve the best results in practical application, will avoid 
unacceptable consequences, and will be consistent with sound public policy." Derhridge 
v. Mutual Protective Ins. Co., 963 P.2d 788, 791 (Utah Ct. App. 1998)(internal citations 
and quotations omitted). See also Wasatch County v. Tax Com 'n, 2009 UT App. 221, % 
13 217 P.3d 270 (noting that statutes should be interpreted with any eye toward "the 
effect it will have in practical application"). "When the court finds a statutory provision 
that causes doubt or uncertainty7 in its application, the court must analyze the act in its 
entirety and harmonize its provisions in accordance with the legislative intent and 
purpose." Miller, 2008 UT at ^  19 (quoting State v. Bluff, 2002 UT 66, ^34, 52 P.3d 1210 
(2003). 
One of the primary purposes of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act is to 
"expedite early evaluation and settlement of claims." UCA § 78B-3-402. Arbitration 
furthers this goal by "providing a method more expeditious and less expensive than the 
court system for the resolution of disputes." Buckner v. Kennard, 2004 UT 78, \ 17, 99 
P.3d 842 (internal citations and quotations omitted). See also Giannopulos v. Pappas, 15 
P.2d 353, 356 (1932) ("[Arbitration is favored in the law as a speedy and inexpensive 
method of adjudicating difference.") Indeed, the Legislature's desire to encourage 
arbitration in the medical malpractice context is evidenced by the inclusion of § 78B-3-
421 in the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act. 
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The nature of the statute itself evidences the Legislature's desire to encourage 
arbitration. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-421 specifies mandatory agreement terms and 
includes the information that must be provided to the patient regarding arbitration, how 
that information is to be provided to the patient, and an acknowledgment by the patient 
that she received the information. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-421(l) (2008). Rather 
than discouraging arbitration agreements between health care providers and patients, the 
level of detail found in the statute displays the Legislature's intent to ensure the 
enforceability of arbitration agreements that meet the requirements of the statute. Indeed, 
the statute is designed to prevent patients from nullifying valid agreements through claims 
of ignorance. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-421(4) (2008). 
The trial court's interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-421 (2008) undermines 
the purpose of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act by making it much more difficult 
for health care providers to enforce arbitration agreements. The trial court interprets the 
statute as requiring a health care provider to prove, by extrinsic evidence, that he verbally 
encouraged the patient to ask questions. [R. 231]. The statute, however, places no such 
affirmative burden on the health care provider. The statute is similarly silent as to how a 
health care provider could prove that such a verbal exchange occurred. Nonetheless, the 
trial court reads into the statute the requirement of extrinsic evidence to prove verbal 
encouragement. Absent extrinsic proof of verbal encouragement, the trial court reasons 
that an arbitration agreement is invalid and unenforceable. [R. 349-52]. 
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The burden of proving verbal encouragement by extrinsic evidence is nearly 
impossible to meet. Absent a recording of the conversation, which is certainly not 
feasible, there is no way to positively prove that such a verbal exchange occurred.6 The 
only conceivable extrinsic evidence that could be offered is an affidavit by the health care 
provider. However, the patient could simply counter with her own affidavit. The 
unavoidable result of the trial court's analysis would be dueling affidavits. [R. 230-34]. 
This would put the trial court in the untenable position of weighing the credibility of 
testimony in a game of he said she said. [R. 228-29]. This is just the type of factual 
dispute that Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-421 w7as designed to avoid. 
Moreover, given the number of patients that pass through physicians' offices and 
hospitals, it would be unlikely that a health care provider w7ould remember giving a 
specific patient verbal encouragement. In most cases, at best, the health provider would 
only be able to provide an affidavit stating that it is his policy or practice to provide such 
verbal encouragement. This affidavit of policy or practice would then be wreighed against 
a plaintiffs affidavit specifically denying verbal encouragement The trial court would 
likely give more wreight to the plaintiffs more specific affidavit. The result would be a 
system in which an otherwise statutorily compliant and binding arbitration agreement 
6
 Under the trial court's analysis, even a provision in the arbitration agreement 
specifically stating that the patient acknowledges that she was verbally encouraged to ask 
questions is not sufficient because the patient could simply deny that she ever read the 
agreement. [R. 231]. Thus, under the Trial Court's analysis, there would be no way for 
health care providers to provide verbal encouragement absent a recording. 
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could be easily invalidated by a simple affidavit by the patient. The result would be far 
fewer arbitrations, thus undermining one of the key purposes of the Health Care 
Malpractice Act. 
B. Legislative Intent Would Best be Served by Enforcing the Arbitration 
Agreement 
The trial court denied Dr. Bova's Motion to Compel Arbitration on the basis that 
"neither of the arbitration agreements signed by Plaintiff are enforceable because Dr. 
Bova failed to present evidence that he verbally encouraged Plaintiff to ask questions 
about the arbitration agreement." [R. 349-52]. The trial court's analysis, however, 
ignores the fact that the purpose of § 78B-3-421, indeed the purpose of the verbal 
encouragement provision, was already fulfilled in this case. 
The statute states that "the patient shall be verbally encouraged to : (i) read the 
written information required by Subsection (l)(a) and the arbitration agreement; and (ii) 
ask any questions." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-421(l)(c) (2008). The purpose of the 
verbal encouragement provision is obvious, the legislature intended that a patient be 
given an opportunity to read and understand the arbitration agreement. 
In this case, Plaintiff signed an Agreement affirming that she was given the 
opportunity to ask questions and that she understood the terms of the Agreement. 
I have received a written explanation of the terms of this Agreement. I have 
had the right to ask questions and have my questions answered. I 
understand that any Claims I might have must be resolved through the 
dispute resolution process in this Agreement instead of having them heard 
by a judge or jury. I understand the role of the arbitrators and the manner in 
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which they are selected. I understand the responsibility for arbitration 
related costs. I understand that this Agreement renews each year unless 
cancelled before the renewal date. I understand that I can decline to enter 
into the Agreement and still receive health care. I understand that I can 
rescind this Agreement within 10 days of signing it. 
[Addendum B at Art. 9]. These acknowledgments plainly demonstrate that the purpose 
of the verbal encouragement provision was met, namely, that Plaintiff was given an 
opportunity to understand wrhat she was signing, thereby avoiding any issues of 
procedural unconscionability. Indeed, Plaintiff expressly acknowledged that she 
understood the terms of the arbitration agreement. It is simply nonsensical to hold the 
agreement unenforceable on the basis that there is no extrinsic evidence of verbal 
encouragement to ask questions wrhen the Plaintiff clearly acknowledges in writing that 
she was given the opportunity to ask questions and, more importantly, that she understood 
the terms of the Agreement. 
Under Utah contract construction policy, this arbitration agreement, including the 
acknowledgements quoted above, should be construed in favor of arbitration. See 
Central Florida Investments Inc. v Parkwest Associates, 2002 UT 3, ^ 16. According to 
the Utah policy favoring arbitration, and viewing the statutory language as a whole, the 
Agreement in this case was validly executed, and the parties are bound by its terms to 
submit to arbitration. 
CONCLUSION 
The April 16th Agreement is valid and enforceable under both Utah statutory7 
mandate, and Utah contract law. Plaintiffs unambiguous acknowledgments clearly 
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demonstrate that she understood the terms of the Agreement negating her claims of 
procedural unconscionability. Plaintiff also received a copy of the Agreement and could 
have rescinded it within ten days of signing it if she disagreed with its terms. 
Fundamentally, Plaintiff had a meaningful choice in entering into the Agreement. The 
trial court erred when it disregarded these plain facts, the policy favoring arbitration, and 
Utah contract law when it relied on Plaintiffs declarations to find the Agreement 
unenforceable. Indeed, the trial court's strict interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-
421 undermines the purpose of the statute and the Utah Healthcare Malpractice Act. 
Accordingly, this Court should reverse the trial court and order Plaintiff to arbitrate her 
claims pursuant to the terms of the April 16th Agreement. 
Respectfully submitted this^J_ day of June, 2010. 
WILLI/(W#/& HUNT 
By . 
[IFRANKENBURG 
STEPHEN T. HESTER 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
Charles Bova, M.D. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEI1& MARTINEAU 
Brian P. Miller 
Kenneth Reich 
Christopher W. Droubay 
Attorneys for Appellant and Defendant 
Pioneer Valley Hospital 
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Compel Arbitration 
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A D D E N D U M 
1 
78B-3-421. Arbitration agreements, 
(1) After May 2,1999? for a binding arbitration agreement between a patient and a health 
care provider to be validly executed or, if the requirements of this Subsection (1) have not been 
previously met on at least one occasion, renewed: 
(a) the patient shall be given, in writing, the following information on: 
(i) the requirement that the patient must arbitrate a claim instead of having the claim 
heard by a judge or jury; 
(ii) the role of an arbitrator and the manner in which arbitrators are selected under the 
agreement; 
(iii) the patient's responsibility, if any, for arbitration-related costs under the agreement; 
(iv) the right of the patient to decline to enter into the agreement and still receive health 
care if Subsection (3) applies; 
(v) the automatic renewal of the agreement each year unless the agreement is canceled in 
writing before the renewal date; 
(vi) the right of the patient to have questions about the arbitration agreement answered; 
(vii) the right of the patient to rescind the agreement within 10 days of signing the 
agreement; and 
(viii) the right of the patient to require mediation of the dispute prior to the arbitration of 
the dispute; 
(b) the agreement shall require that: 
(i) except as provided in Subsection (l)(b)(ii), a panel of three arbitrators shall be 
selected as follows: 
(A) one arbitrator collectively selected by all persons claiming damages; 
(B) one arbitrator selected by the health care provider; and 
(C) a third arbitrator: 
(I) jointly selected by all persons claiming damages and the health care provider; or 
(II) if both parties cannot agree on the selection of the third arbitrator, the other two 
arbitrators shall appoint the third arbitrator from a list of individuals approved as arbitrators by 
the state or federal courts of Utah; or 
(ii) if both parties agree, a single arbitrator may be selected; 
(iii) all parties waive the requirement of Section 78B-3-416 to appear before a hearing 
panel in a malpractice action against a health care provider; 
(iv) the patient be given the right to rescind the agreement within 10 days of signing the 
agreement; 
(v) the term of the agreement be for one year and that the agreement be automatically 
renewed each year unless the agreement is canceled in writing by the patient or health care 
provider before the renewal date; 
(vi) the patient has the right to retain legal counsel; 
(vii) the agreement only apply to: 
(A) an error or omission that occurred after the agreement was signed, provided that the 
agreement may allow a person who would be a proper party in court to participate in an 
arbitration proceeding; 
(B) the claim of: 
(I) a person who signed the agreement; 
(II) a person on whose behalf the agreement was signed under Subsection (6); and 
(HI) the unborn child of the person described in this Subsection (l)(b)(vii)(B), for 12 
months from the date the agreement is signed; and 
(C) the claim of a person who is not a party7 to the contract if the sole basis for the claim 
is an injury sustained by a person described in Subsection (l)(b)(vii)(B); and 
(c) the patient shall be verbally encouraged to: 
(i) read the written information required by Subsection (l)(a) and the arbitration 
agreement; and 
(ii) ask any questions. 
(2) When a medical malpractice action is arbitrated, the action shall: 
(a) be subject to Chapter 31a, Utah Uniform Arbitration Act; and 
(b) include any one or more of the following when requested by the patient before an 
arbitration hearing is commenced: 
(i) mandatory mediation; 
(ii) retention of the jointly selected arbitrator for both the liability7 and damages stages of 
an arbitration proceeding if the arbitration is bifurcated; and 
(hi) the filing of the panel's award of damages as a judgement against the provider in the 
appropriate district court. 
(3) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), a patient may not be denied health care on the sole 
basis that the patient or a person described in Subsection (6) refused to enter into a binding 
arbitration agreement with a health care provider. 
(4) A written acknowledgment of having received a written explanation of a binding 
arbitration agreement signed by or on behalf of the patient shall be a defense to a claim that the 
patient did not receive a written explanation of the agreement as required by Subsection (1) 
unless the patient: 
(a) proves that the person who signed the agreement lacked the capacity to do so; or 
(b) shows by clear and convincing evidence that the execution of the agreement was 
induced by the health care provider's affirmative acts of fraudulent misrepresentation or 
fraudulent omission to state material facts. 
(5) The requirements of Subsection (1) do not apply to a claim governed by a binding 
arbitration agreement that was executed or renewed before May 3,1999. 
(6) A legal guardian or a person described in Subsection 78B-3-406(6), except a person 
temporarily standing in loco parentis, may execute or rescind a binding arbitration agreement on 
behalf of a patient. 
(7) This section does not apply to any arbitration agreement that is subject to the Federal 
Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. Sec. 1 et seq. 
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ARBITRATION AGREEMENT 
article 1 Dispute KesotetfoB 
6y signbg* ihis Agreement ("Agreement") we are agreeing to revive any Claim for medical malpractice by the disp 
resolution process described in this Agreement* Under this Agreement, you can pursue yew Claim and seek damag? 
you are waiving yoii£ right to have it decided by a judge or jury* 
Article! Definitions 
A. The tana "we** "parties" or "us" means you. (the Patient), and the Provider. 
B. The term "Claim" means one or more Istolpractice Actions defined in the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act 
(Utah Code 7S-14-5(15))- Each party may use any tegalproceas to resolve nonmedical malpractice claims. 
Q Tie term ^ Provider* means the physician, group or clinic and their employees, partners, associates, agents, 
successors and estates. 
D. The term patient" or '"you" means: 
(1} you attd any person who mpkes a Claim for care givan to YOU* such as your heirs, year spouse, dill drea, 
parents or legal representatives, AND 
(2) your unborn child or newborn child for care provided during the 12 mon&a immediately following 
(he date yon sign this Agreement,, or any person who-makes a Claim for ease given to that unborn ornewbon 
chili 
Ariic!e3 Plspftte Regoigtioa Options 
Mflflfrdg, Avftfrfote ffflF PfepPfc Rpg9h^9R> We agree to resolve any Claim by: 
(1) working dsreefly with each oiher to fry and find a solution that resolves the Claim, OR 
(2) using non-binding mediation (each of us vriU bear one»hatf of the costs); OR 
(3) using bindfiog arbitration as deacribed in this Agreement 
Von may choose to use any or all of these methods to reaoJve your Claim. 
JLcgafCotqis l^ Eacbofiwiriiiycfcoose tober^ 
resolution process* bat each of us will pay the fees-and costs of our own attorney. 
Arbitration ~ Final Resolution. If working with the Provider or using non-biftding mediation does no* 
resolve year Claim, we agree that your CUdxn wittbe.ieaolved through binding arbitration. We both agree 
that the decision reached m binding arbitration will be final, 
rtide4 How to Arbitrate a Claim 
>fotieet ToxnafceaClaimiindwthis Agreement, mail a written notice to the Provider hy certified mail that 
briefly describes the natuxe of your Claim (the •"Notice"). If the Notice is seat to the Provider by certified mail 
wiQ suspend (toll) the applicable statute of limitations during die dispute resolution process described in this 
Agreement. 
Ajrbitmfors. Within 30 days of receiving fee Notice* the Provider will contact you* If yon and the Provider 
cannot resolve the Claim hy working together or fturough mediation, we wiff start the process of choosing 
arbitrator*. There will be three arbrtratora, Unless wc agree that a single arbitrator amy resolve the Ctatnu 
(1) APT*fo*ted Arbitrator?
 T "You will appoint an arbitrator of your choosing and all Providers will jointly 
appoint an arbitrator of their choosing. 
(2) fcmgv~Sclested Arbitrator. You and the Providers) will then jointly appoint an-arbitrator. (She "Jointly-
'Selected Arbitrate***). If you and 1&6 PrtfvMfcr(s) caxtoot agree upon a ^ ointty-Seleked. 
Arbitrate fh^ arbitrators appohrted*by eacfcof the pWties will choose fee Jointly-Selected Aa&itrator fro 
list of individuals approved as arbitrators by the state or federal courts of Utah. If the aAitraiorscaBiiot 
agree on n Jointly-Selected Arbitrator, either or both of us may reqi&est fbat a Utah court select an indfvk 
from the lists described above. Eadh party will pay their own fees and costs in such an action. The Joint* 
Selected Arbitrator will preside over the arbitration hearing and ha*e all other powers of an arbitrator as 
forth in the Utah Uniform Arbitration Act; 
Arbitration Expenses. You will pay fee fees and costs of the arbitrator you appoint and the ProvlderC*)- wtii 
pay the fees and costs of the arbitrator the Providers) appoints. Each of us will also pay one-half of file fees 
and expenses of die loint!y*Selected Aifcitrator sad any other expenses of the arbitration panel 
Final and Binding Decision, A majority of the three arbitrators will make a final decision on the Claim. The 
decision shaU be consistent with the. Utah Uniform Arbitration Act 
iug 11 2008 3:53PM Spk^e ancl Sportsmedicinc l-L_i-9S4-3249 p. 10 
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ARBITRATION AGREEMENT 
r t ic le l Dispute Resolution 
' signing tbis Agreement ("Agreement") we are agreeing to resolve any Claim for medical malpractice by flic dispute 
solution process described in this Agreement Under this Agreement, you can pursue your Claim and seek damages, br 
u are waiving your light to have it decided by a judge or jury. 
-tide 2 Definitions 
The term "we," "parties" or <cus" means you, (the Patient), and the Provider. 
The term "Claim'" means one or more Malpractice Actions defined in the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act 
(Utah Code 78-14-3(15))- Each party :nay use any legal process to resolve non-medical malpractice claims. 
The term "Provider" means the physician, group or clinic and their employees, partners, associates, agents, 
successors and estates. 
The term "Patienf * or "you" means: 
(1) you and any person who makes a Claim for care given to YOU, such as your heirs* your spouse, children, 
parents or legal representatives, AND 
(2) your unborn child or newborn child for care provided during the 12 months irrunedi&tely following 
the date you sign this Agreement, or any person who-makes a Claim for care given to that unborn or newborn 
child. 
- t ide 3 Dispute Resolution Options 
Methods Available for Dispute Resolution, We agree to resolve any Claim by: 
(1) working directly with each other to try and find a solution that resolves the Claim, OR 
(2) using non-binding mediation (each of us will bear one-half of the costs); OR 
(3) using binding "arbitration as described m this Agreement. 
You may choose to use any. or all of these methods to resolve your Claim. 
Legal Counsel. Each of us may choose to be represented by legal counsel 'during .any stage of the dispute 
resolution process, but each of us wall pay the fees and costs of our own attorney. 
Arbitration—Pinal Resolution. If working with the Provider or using non-binding mediation does not 
resolve your Claim, we agree thai your Claim, will be .resolved through binding arbitration. We both agree 
feat the decision reached in binding arbitration will be final. 
t i d e 4 How, to Arbitrate a Claim 
Notice. To make a Claim under this Agreement, mail a written notice to the Provider by certified mail that 
briefly describes the nature of your Claim (the "Notice"). If the Notice is sent to the Provider by certified mail v 
will suspend (toll) the applicable statute of limitations during the dispute resolution process described in this 
Agreement. 
Arbitrators. "Within .30 days of receiving the Notice> the Provider will contact you. If you and the Provider 
cannot resolve the Claim by working together or through mediation, we will start the prdfcess of choosing 
arbitrators. There will be three arbitrators* unless we agree that a single arbitrator may resolve the Claim. 
(1) Appointed Arbitrators. You will appoint an arbitrator of your choosing and all Providers will jointly 
appoint an arbitrator of their choosing. 
(2) Jointly-Selected Arbitrator. You and the Providers) will then jointly appoint an arbitrator (the "Jointly-
Selected Arbitrator1'). If you and the Providers) caanot agree upon a Jointly-Selected * "' 
Arbitrator, the arbitrators appointed by each of the parties "will choose the Jointly-Selected Arbitrator fro 
list of individuals approved as arbitrators by the state or federal courts of Utah. If the arbitrators cannot 
agree on a Jointly-Selected Arbitrator, either or both of us may request that a Utah court select an indivi< 
from the lists described above. Each party will pay their own fees and costs in such an action. The Jointl 
Selected Arbitrator will preside over the arbitration hearing and have all other powers of an arbitrator as 
forth in the Utah Uniform Arbitration Act 
Arbitration Expenses. You will pay the fees and costs of the arbitrator you appoint and the Providers)
 wyj 
pay the fees and costs of the sdbilrator the Providers) appoints. Each of us will also pay one-half of the fees 
and expenses of the Jointly-Selected Arbitrator and any other expenses of the arbitration panel 
Final and Binding Decision. A majority of the three arbitrators will make a final decision on the Claim. The 
decision shall be consistent with the. Utah Uniform Arbitration Act. 
All Claims May be Joined, Any person or entity thai could be appropriately named in a court proceeding ("Joine 
Party") is entitled to participate in this arbitration as long as that person.or entity agrees to be bound by the 
arbitration decision ("Joinder"). Joinder may also include Claims against persons or entities that provided care 
prior to the signing date of this Agreement. A "Joined Party" does not participate in the selection of the arbitrate-
but is considered a "Provider" for all other purposes of this Agreement, 
t i d e 5 Liability and Damages May Be Arbitrated Separately 
the request of either party, the issues of liability and damages will be arbitrated separately. If the arbitration panel fine 
>ility> the parties may agree to either continue to arbitrate damages with the-initial panel or either party may cause that 
ond panel be selected for considering damages. However, if a second panel is selected, the Jointly Selected arbitrator 
3 remain the same and will continue to preside over the arbitration unless the parties agree otherwise. 
t i d e 6 Venue / Governing Law 
e arbitration healings will be held in a place agreed to by the parties. If the parties cannot agree, thehearings will be he 
Salt Lake City, Utah. Arbitration proceedings are private and shall be kept confidential The provisions of the Utah 
iferm Arbitration Act and die Federal Arbitration Act govern this Agreement. We hereby waive the prelitigaiion pane 
lew requirements. - The arbitrators will apportion fault to all persons or entities that contributed to the injury claimed tr 
t Patient, whether or not those persons or entities are parties to the arbitration. 
•t ide 7 Term / Rescission / Termination 
Term. This Agreement is binding on both of us for one year from the date yon'sign it unless yon rescind i t If i} 
not rescinded, it will automatically renew every year unless either party notifies the other in writing of a decision-
terminate it 
Rescission. You may rescind this Agreement within 10 days.of signing it by sending written notice hy registered 
certified mail to the Provider, The effective date of the rescission notice will be the date the rescission is 
postmarked If not rescinded, this Agreement will govern all medical services received by the Patient from Provi 
after the date of signing, except in the case of a Joined Party that provided care prior to the signing of this agreem 
(see Article 4(E)). 
Termination. If the Agreement has not been rescinded, either party may still terminate it at any time, but 
termination will not take effect until the next anniversary of the signing of the Agreement To terminate this 
Agreement, send written notice by registered or certified mail to the Provider. This Agreement applies to any Cla 
that arises while it is in effect, even if you file a Claim or reqnest arbitration after the Agreement has been 
terminated. 
.rticleS Severability 
r
 any part of this Agreement is held to be invalid or. unenforceable, the remaining provisions will remain in Ml force ai? * 
'ill not be affected by the invalidity of any other provision. 
article 9 Acknowledgement of Written Explanation of Arbitration 
have received a written explanation of the terms of this Agreement I have had the right to ask questions and have my 
[uestions answered. I understand that any Claim I might have must be resolved through the dispute resolution process in 
his Agreement instead of having them heard by a judge or jury. I understand the role of the arbitrators and the manner i 
vhich they are selected. I understand the responsibility for arbitration related costs. I understand that this Agreement 
'eiie\tfs*eaclryear Mnless cancelled before the reifew&l date. I understahdlhat'I can decline "to- enter into the Agreement an 
still receive health care. I understand that I can rescind this Agreement within 10 days of signing it 
Article 10 Receipt of Copy I have received a copy of this document 
Charles Bova, MD 
Provider Christopher Caldwell, DO 
Howard Loomis, DO /? / / 
ISlanie of Physician, Group or Clinic Kame of Patient (Print) 
o3y: . _ _ 
Signature of Physician or Authorized Agent Signature of Patient or Patient's Representative (Date 
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CLARK NEWHALL (#7091) 
CHERIK. GOCHBERG (#8186) 
Law Office of Clark Newhall MD ID 
57 W. 200 South, Suite 101 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Telephone: (801) 363-8888 
Fax: (801) 596-8888 
cnewhall@cnewhall. com 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
APR 0 1 2010 
SALI LAKE COUWfT 
By. 
Deputy Clerk 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GLENNA STEWART 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CHARLES BOVA MD and PIONEER 
VALLEY HOSPITAL 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON 
DEFENDANT BOVA'S MOTION TO 
STAY PROCEEDINGS AND COMPEL 
ARBITRATION 
Case No. 090900273 
SALT LAKE CITY DIVISION 
Judge Kennedy 
The Court heard arguments on defendant Bova's Motion to Stay Proceedings and Compel 
Arbitration on 6/15/09 and ordered supplemental briefing on whether the lack of a date on the 
arbitration agreement rendered it unenforceable. The Court heard further argument on 10/19/09 
and, being fully advised in the matter, makes the following Order: 
The Defendant's Motion to Stay Proceedings and Compel Arbitration is denied. The 
plaintiff will prepare an Order and Memorandum of Decision. 
The Defendant's Motion to Stay Discovery Pending Appeal is due in five days, The 
plaintiff may submit a responsive brief five days after the Motion is filed The defendant may 
submit a reply brief five days after plaintiffs brief is filed The Court makes a preliminary 
ruling that discovery should proceed. 
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION 
The following issues were presented for decision: 
Was the arbitration agreement signed before the allegedly negligent procedure? 
Was the plaintiff "verbally encouraged" to read the written information and ask 
questions? 
The Court declined to decide the first issue. The Court determined that the second issue 
was a matter of law and was dispositive of this motion. 
The arbitration statute U.C.A §78B-3-421 (1) (c) (formerly and at the time this dispute 
arose U.C.A §78-14-17) requires that 'for a binding arbitration agreement between a patient and 
a health care provider to be validly executed" . . . "the patient shall be verbally encouraged" to 
read the written information and ask questions. 
Plaintiff asserted in her declaration that no such verbal encouragement occurred prior to 
the allegedly negligent procedure, She stated "No one asked me if I had any questions, or 
encouraged me to ask questions regarding any of the documents I signed/' 
Defendant asserted by affidavit that "I answered any of Mrs. Stewart's questions 
regarding the arbitration agreement and confirmed that Mrs. Stewart understood the terms of the 
arbitration agreement and that if we had a dispute related to the procedure, the dispute would be 
addressed in arbitration." 
The Court finds that defendant's affidavit is insufficient to create an issue of fact as to 
whether or not he verbally encouraged plaintiff as required by the statute. The Court determines, 
as a matter of law, that the phrase in the signed arbitration agreement stating "I have had the 
right to ask questions and have my questions answered" does not satisfy the requirement of the 
statute that the patient be "verbally encouraged/' Therefore, the Court finds that there is no issue 
of fact to resolve in determining this motion. The Court finds that there is no proof that 
defendant "verbally encouraged" the patient as required by statute. 
The Court finds, as a matter of law, that the party seeking to enforce a contract such as an 
arbitration agreement bears the burden of proving its validity. "Most contracts bind only those 
who bargain for them, and the burden of proof for showing the parties' mutual assent as to all 
material terms and conditions is on the party claiming that there is a contract, Arbitration 
agreements are not exempt from this rule." Bvbee v. Abdulla. 189 P.3d 40, 43 (Utah, 2008) 
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted.) 
Each of the three elements of subsection (1) of the statute is required before an arbitration 
agreement can be "validly executed." The defendant, who is seeking to enforce this agreement, 
cannot prove that his conduct met one of the three elements of the statute, the requirement of 
subsection (l)(c) that "the patient shall be verbally encouraged" to ask questions. 
The defendant argues that the declaration of plaintiff is insufficient to alter the terms of 
the contract, because the contractual terms are unambiguous and therefore are not subject to 
alteration by extrinsic or parol evidence. The Court is not persuaded by this argument because 
the argument assumes that the contract in question is valid. The Court has determined that this is 
not a valid contract because it does not meet the statutory requirements uto be validly executed," 
Therefore, as a matter of law, there is no contract between the parties and no terms to which the 
Court must apply parol or extrinsic evidence. 
/s/ ^ f ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ X D a t e V - / - o 2 ^ O 
Hon. John 
Judse, ThiMpistricb^ouft^ £ 
\^;-:^-AA /J-j? 
Prepared by: V '*^X><\>Vy 
i U r 
QyUJl KW^i^ 
CLARK NEWHALL 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Approved as to form: 
/s/ refused to sign Date 
Steve Hester 
Kurt Frankenburg 
Williams & Hunt 
Attorneys for defendant Bova 
I si no response received Date 
Ken Reich 
Brian Miller 
Snow Christensen & Martineau 
Attomevs for defendant Pioneer Valley 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on/^M^)
 ( ^ 2 ^ 9 _ j c a u s e d a ^ ^ 
copy of the above and foregoing to be served by depositing in the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, to: 
correct 
Brian Miller 
Snow Christiansen & Martineau 
10 Exchange Place 11th Floor 
Salt Lake City UT 84145 
Attorney for Pioneer Valley Hospital 
Kurt Frankenburg 
Williams & Hunt 
PO Box 45678 
257 E. 200 South, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City UT 84145-5678 
Attorney for Charles Bova 
Legal Assistant / 
Law Office of Clark Newhall MD JD 
